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Armington elasticities and tariff regime: 
An application to European Union rice imports 
 
Abstract 
Most of the European Union’s (EU) import sources for rice are in developing countries and 
the least developed countries (LDCs). The EU has moreover made a commitment to allow 
duty free and quota free access to rice imports originating in the LDCs from September 2009 
onward. The purpose of this article is to answer two questions – First: Does the inclusion of 
import tariffs in the specification lead to different estimated Armington elasticities? Second: 
When a discriminating tariff is introduced, what happens to the market share of large rice 
exporters  to  the  EU,  especially  to  the  market  share  of poor  countries?  Consequently,  we 
present the Armington model, derived from a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility 
function, and a non-homothetic CES utility functional form, which is more flexible. Then, we 
estimate the Armington model, with and without the inclusion of a tariff, and we compare the 
elasticities. Lastly, we model five scenarios with different discriminating import tariff rates to 
calculate the changes in the market access of large rice exporters to the EU. Our empirical 
results show that it is worthwhile to consider non homothetic preferences and import tariffs. 
When the model is estimated, ignoring the import tariffs and the non homothetic parameter, 
results  may  be  biased  and  of  uncertain  validity.  Furthermore  the  simulation  findings 
demonstrate that in spite of a large difference between import tariff rate of Suriname and other 
countries (scenario V), its market access would not change greatly. This may be caused by 
supply  side  problems  like  poor  infrastructures,  weak  technology  and  small  capacity 
production in LDCs. 
Keywords: Armington elasticity, tariff discrimination, non homothetic, utility function, EU, 
rice. 









Élasticités d'Armington et droits de douane :  
Une application aux importations européennes de riz  
 
Résumé 
La  plupart  des  sources  d’importation  européennes  de  riz  proviennent  des  pays  en 
développement (PED) et des pays les moins avancés (PMA). L'Union Européen (UE) s’est 
d'ailleurs engagée à permettre un libre accès aux importations de riz provenant des PMA à 
partir de septembre 2009. Le but de cet article est de répondre à deux questions. La prise en 
compte des droits de douane à l'importation dans la spécification du modèle mène t elle à 
différentes élasticités estimées ? Quand un droit de douane discriminant est introduit, qu’en 
est il de la part de marché des grands exportateurs de riz vers l'UE, particulièrement en ce qui 
concerne celle des pays pauvres ? En conséquence, nous présentons le modèle d'Armington, 
dérivé d'une fonction d’utilité à élasticité de substitution constante (CES), et une fonction 
d’utilité CES non homothétique plus flexible. Puis, nous estimons le modèle d'Armington, 
avec et sans la prise en compte d’un droit de douane, et nous comparons les élasticités. Pour 
finir,  nous  modélisons  cinq  scénarios  avec  différents  droits  de  douane  pour  calculer  les 
changements de parts de marché des grands exportateurs de riz. Nos résultats empiriques 
montrent : a) quand le droit de douane est omis, les élasticités d'Armington peuvent être sous 
estimées et b) avec le droit de douane discriminatoire, le modèle d'Armington original est plus 
sensible  que  le  modèle  non homothétique.  Il  est  donc  intéressant  de  considérer  des 
préférences non homothétiques puisque, si le modèle est estimé en ignorant le droit de douane 
et le paramètre non homothétique, les résultats peuvent être biaisés et non fiables. Finalement, 
des simulations sont réalisées à partir de cinq scénarii. Les résultats montrent que, malgré une 
grande différence entre les droits de douane du Suriname et ceux dans d’autres pays (scénario 
V), la part de marché du Suriname ne changerait pas beaucoup. Ce problème peut être causé 
par  la  faible  capacité  de  production  dans  ce  pays  (un  problème  d’offre).  Cela  montre  la 
difficulté de ces pays (les PMA) à concurrencer les pays développés comme les États Unis. 
Mots-clés :  Elasticité  d’Armington,  discrimination  tarifaire,  non homothétique,  fonction 
d’utilité, UE, riz. 
Classification JEL : C2, D1, F1, Q1 




Armington elasticities and tariff regime: 
           An application to European Union rice imports 
 
1.   Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is the largest agricultural market in the world and accounts for 
approximately 20% of total exports and imports of agricultural products. Most of the EU’s 
import sources are in developing countries and the least developed countries (LDCs), and the 
increase of agricultural exports plays a key role in the development and reduction of poverty 
in  these  countries.  Furthermore,  EU  programmes  include  the  Generalized  System  of 
Preferences (GSP), which contains a special scheme for the LDCs known as the ‘Everything 
But Arms Agreement’ (EBA), the Cotonou Agreement with Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries  (ACP)  and  the  Euro Mediterranean  Agreements  (EMA).  The  EBA  provides  the 
LDCs with duty free accesses to EU markets, without quotas or other restrictions, for most 
agricultural products. Within the framework of the EBA, the EU has made a commitment to 
allow duty free and quota free access to imports of rice originating in the LDCs, starting in 
September 2009. In this context, intensified price competition among rice producing countries 
is foreseeable. Thus, to calculate changes in market shares, accurate estimation of substitution 
elasticities (or Armington elasticities) between import sources is crucial. 
Prior  to  the  last  reform  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP),  signed  in  2003  and 
entering into force in 2005 or later, the EU imposed a common tariff on the rice exporters. 
Nevertheless,  since  the  price  of  rice  is  not  the  same  for  each  trading  partner,  this  tariff 
represented from 20% to 50% of the import price (depending on the type of rice, the source 
and the period under consideration). According to the new agreement (EBA), the EU intends 
to reduce or remove the tariff for some rice exporting countries in 2009 (particularly for 
LDCs  such  as  Suriname  and  Guyana).  In  addition,  the  EU  has  many  regional  trade 
agreements (RTAs) with other countries, especially with rice exporting countries (Thailand 
and the USA). 
Therefore,  the  most  interesting  questions  are: After  the  change  in  tariffs,  will  the  market 
shares change? Namely, with a discriminating tariff, what happens to the market share of 
poor countries in the EU market, or: Could this new tariff regime help the LDCs increase 
their exports? The identification of the elasticity of substitution plays a key role in the answer 




The Armington elasticities have a crucial function in applied models used in assessing the 
impacts of policy changes such as tariffs and taxes. They are based on the assumption that 
consumers distinguish different varieties of goods by country of origin and, in the case of rice, 
obtain variable satisfaction depending on the country from which the rice is imported. In 
addition, these elasticities are important for computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
because the degree to which a policy change will affect the country’s economic aggregates 
depends on the level of the elasticity used in the model. The size of these elasticities can also 
have  a  large  effect  on  the  terms  of  trade  (the  ratio  of  export  to  import  prices  that  are 
sometimes used as a proxy for the relative social welfare of a country) and the implied tariff 
equivalent of trade agreements.  
Despite their determinant role, before reaching the conclusions of this article, we found many 
studies
1 in the literature that did not take into consideration tariffs when estimating Armington 
elasticities.  They  justify  this  omission  by  the  shortage  or  absence  of  sufficient  data  and, 
allowing themselves a certain latitude as well, they use an untested hypothesis, i.e. that the 
same tariff applied on all import sources does not change the relative price, thus does not lead 
to changes in elasticities (regardless of the type of tariff). Most of World Bank and GTAP 
(Global  Trade  Analysis  Project)  studies  view  this  conception  with  leniency,  but  if  this 
negligence leads to changes in the value of substitution elasticities, then the results of these 
studies cannot be considered entirely valid.  
Therefore, we first try to answer the following questions:  Does the inclusion of an import 
tariff in the estimation lead to different estimated Armington elasticities?  Second, as was 
mentioned above: With a discriminating tariff, what happens to the market share of large rice 
exporters to EU, especially to the market share of the poor countries? 
After  the  removal  of  obstacles  and  barriers  to  trade  and  the  creation  of  monetary  union, 
agricultural products can be carried and re exported very easily between EU Member States. 
Consequently, in this study we remove the re exports between EU Member States and only 
consider the external EU trade. 
Most of EU rice import tariffs are fixed rate tariffs. The fixed rate term means that the same 
import  tax  per  unit  is  applied  no  matter  how  much  is  imported  or  regardless  of  the 
international or domestic prices of the commodity. For example, a fixed rate tariff on a certain 
                                                 
1 Armington, 1969; Sarris, 1983; Alston et al., 1990; Ito et al., 1990; Yang and Koo, 1993; Davis and Kruse, 




class  of  rice  (100610     rice  in  the  husk)  shipped  into  the  EU  was  211  Euros  per  1000 
kilograms  in  2001,  whatever  its  market  price  or  imported  value  (see  table  1  in  the  next 
section). The weight of the fixed rate tariff plainly decreases as the price rises.  
Therefore, in order to answer the above questions, we first estimate the Armington model, 
with and without the inclusion of tariffs, over the period 1962 2004, and we compare the 
elasticities in both cases. Then, we simulate five scenarios with respect to import tariff rates 
(tariff  discrimination)  and,  with  the  estimated  elasticities  from  the  previous  section,  we 
calculate the market access of large rice exporters to the EU.  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides an overview of EU’s rice tariff 
regime. Section 3 presents the Armington model derived from a CES utility function, and a 
non homothetic CES utility functional form model, which is more flexible. Data are described 
in section 4. Then the results are presented in section 5. The final section concludes. 
 
2.   EU’s rice tariff regime 
The EU is one of the world’s largest rice importers in value terms, with approximately 29% of 
the world’s imports (FAOSTAT database). We focus on the two most imported rice types, 
rice in the husk and rice glazed or polished, for which we have data available. (For greater 
detail on rice type and classification, see section 4).  
In order to protect domestic producers and to control market access, the EU has established 
both a quota system and a tariff system. There are two separate sets of trade arrangements for 
EU rice imports: import duties and import quotas.  
Import duties: Transitional import duty arrangements are in place, subsequent to agreements 
concluded with the EU's main supplier countries (the USA, India, Pakistan and Thailand). The 
negotiations were conducted after the 2003 CAP reform. Under these agreements, the new 
import arrangements provide for the introduction of fixed duties. Agreement has also been 
reached on a reduction of the duties. The EU rice tariff regime is summarized in table 1 from 
1998 to 2007. 
2 The table shows that the EU reduced import tariffs on rice over the past ten 
years.  Moreover,  before  2005  the  EU  imposed  the  same  tariff  for  all  exporters     or  the 
difference  of  tariff  rates  was  not  great;  but  in  recent  years,  the  EU  has  followed  tariff 
discrimination.  For  example,  in  2007  in  addition  to  the  special  RTAs  with  the  USA  and 
                                                 




Thailand, the tariff rates on rice in the husked were 69.51 (Euro/1000 kg) for ACP countries 
and 211 (Euro/1000 kg) for other countries (table 1).  
 
Table 1: EU imports tariff by type of rice (Euro/1000 kg) 
 
Rice in the husk 
(paddy rice or rough rice ) 
Semi-milled or wholly-milled rice 
(whether or not polished or glazed) 
HS code  1006 10  1006 30 
  Erga omnes  Preferential tariff 
quota  Erga omnes  Preferential tariff 
quota 
Year  Third country 
duty  ACP  Third country 
duty  ACP 
1998  270.5  Na  533  Na 
1999  250.7  Na  477.69  Na 
2000  230.8  Na  455  Na 
2001  211  Na  416  Na 
2002  211  Na  416  Na 
2003  211  Na  416  Na 
2004  211  Na  360.14  Na 
2005  211  69.51  175  38.36 
2006  211  69.51  145  38.36 
2007  211  69.51  145  38.36 
Source: the Export Helpdesk online service, provided by the EC (http://exporthelp.europa.eu/) 
Na = not available. 
 
Import quotas: Various preferential quota arrangements exist for rice imports: the GATT 
quota, ACP quota, EBA quota and some regional trade agreements with exporter countries 
such as Thailand (table 2)
3. 
                                                 




i.  GATT  quota:  In  the  context  of  the  GATT  negotiations,  the  EU  has  agreed  to  two 
separate duty free quotas of 63,000t and 13,500t for milled/semi milled rice and quotas of 
rice in the husk (EU Commission Regulation, 1998). 
ii.  ACP/OCT quota: Reduced duty rate quotas of 125,000t (husked) also exist for imports 
of rice from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Rice imports originating 
in the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) are exempt from customs duties under a 
quota of 35,000t (husked), of which 25,000t are reserved for the Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba and 10,000t for the least developed OCT. These imports take place under the ACP 
States and the OCT cumulation arrangements (EU Commission Regulation, 2003). 
iii.  Everything But Arms (EBA): Under the Everything But Arms Agreement, the EU 
granted duty free access to its market to imports from the LDCs for all goods except arms 
and  munitions.  However,  special  arrangements  apply  for  three  sensitive  products, 
including  rice.  Full  liberalization  will  apply  from  2009.  A  duty free  quota,  based  on 
previous exports to the EU, was opened from the marketing year 2002 2003 (2,895t) and 
will be increased by 15% each year until 2008/09 (6,694t), when all tariffs and quotas will 
be removed (EU Commission Regulation,  2002). 
Tariff agreement on Thai rice: On September 5th 2005, the EC presented an agreement on 
the tariffs applying to rice imports to Member States from Thailand. This measure provides 
for  an  adjustment  of  tariffs  applied  to  semi milled  and  milled  rice  every  six  months, 
depending on actual imports and the reference import price, so that they fall within the range 
of Euros 145 175 per ton (EC press, 2005).  
 
Table 2: Rice import quotas imposed by the EU 
Year  Agreement  Quota 
1995  GATT 
duty free quotas of 63,000t (Semi-milled /milled ) 
duty free quotas of 13,500t (husked) 
2003  ACP 
duty  rate quotas 125,000t (husked) (ACP direct route) 
duty rate quotas 35,000t (husked) (OCT route) 
2003  EBA  duty free quota 2,895t and will be increased by 15% each year until 
2008/09 (6,694t) when all tariffs and quotas will be removed 




As it can be seen in table 2, the types of quota are not the same, nor are quotas generally 
imposed on large exporting countries   with the exception of the ACP quota. In this paper, we 
follow the Armington procedure to calculate the elasticities of substitution and changes in 
market  access;  however,  this  method  alone  cannot  account  for  the  effects  of  quotas. 
Furthermore, neither exporting countries nor the kinds of rice usually studied benefit from 
duty free quotas. Our study focuses on the implications of tariffs. 
 
3.   The Armington model 
3.1.   Overview of the model 
Armington  (1969)  proposed  to  distinguish  products  from  different  suppliers  in  a  market. 
Using a two stage budgeting method, he supposed in the first stage that a buyer (or importing 
country) determines the total quantity to buy to maximize the utility, and in the second stage, 
allocates shares of the total quantity to individual suppliers (or exporting countries) in order to 
minimize the costs. In the first stage equation, he specifies the total demand for both foreign 
and domestic products as the dependent variable.  
Armington  (1969)  specifies  the  CES  form  for  the  utility  function,  which  he  maximizes, 
subject to a budget constraint: 





















i iq p E
1
   (s¹ 1,    ∑i bi = 1,      bi Î[0,1]"i)   (2) 
where, E is the total expenditure on imports, U is the utility, pi is the price of imported good 
from source i, qi is the quantity of imports from source i, b is the parameter that gives the 
weight associated with particular commodity, and s is the elasticity of substitution between 
import sources. Thus, if equation (1) is maximized subject to equation (2), we obtain the 
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where  P  is  calculated  with Stone’s  price  index.
4  Therefore,  we  can  write  equation  (3)  in 
logarithmic form (equation 5) and estimate it to calculate the elasticity of substitution between 











i i i ln ) 1 ( ln ) . ln( s s    (5) 
The  Armington  model  has  been  widely  used  for  international  trade  analysis  because  this 
simple linear specification is consistent with utility maximization and because it economizes 
degrees of freedom in empirical applications (Sarris, 1983; Alston et al., 1990; Ito et al., 1990; 
Duffy et al., 1990; Yang and Koo, 1993; Davis and Kruse, 1993; Kapuscinski and Warr, 
1999; Surry et al., 2001; Xu, 2002; Gallaway et al., 2003 and Saito, 2004). 
Suppose now that an importing country imposes a different tariff rate on each import source, 
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where pi is the price of the imported good from source i, and ti is the tariff rate of imported 
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where P
* is calculated with the Stone’s price index, explicitly including tariffs.
5 
3.2.   Respecification with non-homothetic CES utility function 
In 1969, Armington presented his model and used it to analyze trade in chemical products 
under the assumption that there were no major trade restrictions. In his example, suppliers of 
chemicals, including the domestic suppliers, sell in a market with no major barriers. Namely, 
the buyer (or the importing country) only considers relative prices among the products from 
different suppliers (or exporting countries). The Armington model also assumes that goods 
imported from different countries (or regions) create different consumer utilities, which is to 
say that the elasticities of substitution among the goods imported from different places are not 
infinite.  
                                                 
4 The Stone’s price index is lnP=Sjwj lnpj, in which w is the expenditure share of the source in the total imports. 
5 The Stone’s price index including tariffs is lnP




Furthermore, the Armington model is based on the CES utility function. This functional form 
is homothetic. It implies that the size of the market, as measured by expenditure, does not 
affect  each  exporting  country’s  relative  market  share,  the  result  being  that  expenditure 
elasticities  are  identical  and  unitary.  This  assumption,  although  making  the  specification 
easier, may also be too restrictive for empirical research. If a good is differentiated so that 
each product yields different utility, an increase in the buyer’s budget may not be allocated in 
the same proportion to all products. A relatively high proportion would probably be allocated 
to the higher quality or more preferred products, other factors remaining constant (Yang and 
Koo, 1993). 
Pishbahar and Huchet Bourdon (2007) calculate the Armington elasticities for two types of 
rice imported by the EU using this Armington model and then using a model based on a non 
homothetic utility function. They show that a non homothetic model yields more consistent 
estimated elasticities. The more flexible forms are important: they are more reliable than the 
Armington  elasticities  when  utilized  in  the  kind  of  CGE  models  widely  used  in  many 
countries and in institutions such as the World Bank to estimate the term of trade effect or the 
implied tariff equivalent of the RTAs. 
















i i i q b U    (8) 
(s¹ 1,     (qi   mi) ³ 0,     ∑i bi = 1,     bi Î[0,1]"i)     
The novelty in specifying preferences is the influence of the non homothetic parameter mi. 
When mi =0 for all i, then equation (8) is identical to equation (1), i.e. U is a homothetic CES 
function with an elasticity of substitution (s). Additionally, the condition of qi   mi ³ 0 is 
required because consumption must be positive. 
If mi  is positive, it  is interpreted as a subsistence level requirement, consumers having to buy 
at  least  mi  of  good  i,  first  allocating  a  fraction  of  their  budget  to  meet  the  minimum 
consumption requirement. In this case, the Engel curves are straight lines shifted below the 
origin by a positive constant (figure 1). If mi  is negative, then the Engel curves are shifted 
above the origin, implying that consumers buy the commodity if income exceeds a certain 




homothetic parameter, even though the elasticity of total consumption (piqi) with respect to 
total income (E) still does. 
As  in  the  homothetic  CES  function,  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  the  qi     mi  is 
constant. 
 




Thus,  by  using  the  Lagrangean  function  to  maximize  the  non homothetic  utility  function 
(equation  8),  subject  to  expenditure  function  (equation  2),  the  procedure  generates  the 
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There  is  no  empirical  evidence  on  mi  in  the  context  of  trade.  As  a  result,  to  take  into 
consideration this dimension (mi), we need more information, or we have to use non linear 
estimates. In this research, equation (10) is estimated with nonlinear estimation.  
Now, if we consider the import tariff, the new Armington equation is: 
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In section 5, we report the estimated original Armington model (equations 5 and 7) and the 
non homothetic Armington model (equations 10 and 11), in the both cases, with and without a 
tariff rate for two types of rice. Then we compare the results.  
 
4.   Data  
The prices and the quantities of imports are collected from the United Nation Commodity 
Trade Statistics (Comtrade) over the 43 years from 1962 to 2004 and deflated using the GDP 
deflator index series from the International Financial Statistics (IFS). The EU’s rice imports 
are studied over the entire period.
6  The unit price (pi) is in USA dollars ($), and the unit 
import  (qi)  quantity  is  in  kilograms  (kg).  The  Comtrade  database  relies  on  the  Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) with 4 digit codes. This system attributes two 4 
digit codes for rice: the code of 0421 is for ‘rice in the husk’, and the code of 0422 is for ‘rice, 
glazed or polished’. For both types of rice, we consider all import sources and select the 
principal sellers (the sources of import) to the EU(15) during the 1962 2004 period. The EU’s 
tariff rates are collected from the Export Helpdesk online service provided by the European 
Commission (EC) since they are unavailable in the Comtrade database. The tariff data from 
the EC database relies on the Harmonized System (HS) with 6 digit codes. The HS classifies 
the rice in four subgroups. Allowing ourselves some flexibility, we choose to account for the 
tariff on rice in the husk (with 1006 10 HS code) in the same way as for rice in the husk (with 
0421 SITC code), and for semi milled/milled rice glazed or polished (with 1006 30 HS code) 
as for rice glazed or polished (with 0422 SITC code).  
 
                                                 
6 In this study, the European Union contains 15 countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The 

































Rice in the husk
(1962-2004)
Rice in the husk
(2000-2004)
Rice glazed   
(1962-2004)









Source: Commodity Trade Statistics of UN (Comtrade) 
 
Figure 2 shows the average share of the leading exporters to the market of the EU(15) for 
both kinds of rice in the two periods, 1962 2004 and 2000 2004. Principal sellers are those 
having the highest average import share in the EU each year over the period. The principal 
exporters of rice in the husk to the EU are the USA, India, Thailand and Suriname. Other 
countries are accounted for in the rest of the world group, labelled ‘Rest’. The USA have the 
largest share in the EU market over the entire period. Namely, the EU imported 45.5% of rice 
in the husk from the USA, 17.6% from India, 8.8% from Suriname and 7.5% from Thailand. 
However, the average share of these countries in the EU market has changed from 2000 to 
2004. More precisely, the average shares of India and Thailand have increased to 36% and 
10% respectively, while the average shares of the USA and Suriname have decreased. 
Similarly, for rice glazed or polished the primary sources of imports to the EU are the USA 
(36.4%), Thailand (28.7%), India (4.7%), Suriname (2.9%) and Australia (2.9%) over the 
1962 2004 period. In recent years, the average shares of the USA, Australia and Suriname 
have decreased, while the shares of Thailand and India have increased. 
Therefore, data show a shift in the import sources of the EU. In other words, the EU imported 
more in recent years from South Asia than from the USA or the African countries. Perhaps 
the greater stability in policies and economic situations, in addition to the higher quality of 
rice imported from Thailand and  India, due to the cheaper price of this product in those 





5.   Estimated results 
5.1.   Does  including  a  tariff  in  the  estimation  alter  estimated  substitution 
elasticities? 
The suppliers of rice to the EU market are in competition with each other, and the specific 
supplier’s behaviour is not independent from the behaviour of other suppliers in the market. 
As a result, the demand equations for all individual products from different suppliers must be 
estimated simultaneously in a system. The seemingly unrelated regression analysis originally 
developed by Zellner is appropriate. 
Two types of Armington models (based on different utility functions), with and without the 
inclusion of an import tariff, are estimated over the period 1962 2004, and the results obtained 
are reported in tables 3 to 6. Table 3 shows the estimated results of the original Armington 
models (with and without tariffs included, respectively equations 5 and 7), and table 4 shows 
the non homothetic Armington models (with and without tariffs, respectively equations 10 
and 11) for rice, glazed or polished. The same estimated models for rice in the husk are 
reported in tables 5 and 6. To estimate the models with tariffs, we use the 1998 tariff rates for 
the years before 1998, deflating them with the GDP deflator index from the IFS. 
As shown in table 3 for rice, glazed or polished, the elasticities of substitution (s) in the 
original Armington model are 1.22 when a tariff is not included in the estimation and 2.44 
when it is. The elasticities are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. For rice in the 
husk, they are 0.92 and 1.24 respectively (table 5). 
Then, with a non homothetic CES utility function, the estimated s are equal to 0.99 when a 
tariff is not included and 1.22 when it is. These estimations too are significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level (table 4). Table 6 shows the same results for rice in the husk (s 
being  equal  to  0.87  and  0.99,  respectively  without  and  with  the  tariff  inclusion  in  the 
estimation). In table 4, mi is significantly different from zero at the 5% level in three cases 
without tariffs; it is positive for Australia and negative for India and the rest of the world. 
However, it is significantly negative for the USA and Thailand when tariffs are included. In 
table 6 too, the mi values are significant and negative for two sources (the USA and the rest of 
the world). 




Table 3: The elasticity of substitution (s s s s) in original Armington model - Rice glazed or 
polished 
Without tariff (equation 5)  With tariff (equation 7) 
Import Sources 






Rest of the world 
1.22
*  9.86  2.44
*  9.75 
* denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Note: Results after correction of autocorrelation. 
 
 
Table 4 - Armington model with a non-homothetic CES utility function - Rice glazed or 
polished 
Without tariff (equation 10)  With tariff (equation 11) 
Import Sources 
s  t value  mi  t value  s  t value  mi  t value 
USA   13099608   1.15   123000000
*   1.92 
Thailand   8754672   0.72   140000000
*   2.07 
India   15851191
*   5.44   13241248   1.36 
Suriname  2939671  1.38   8296966   1.26 
Australia  9978440
*  2.80  1974123  0.30 
Rest of the world 
0.99
*  9072.5 
 114000000
*   3.56 
1.22
*  3.90 
 822477   0.02 
* denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Note: Results after correction of autocorrelation. 




Table 5: The elasticity of substitution (s s s s) in original Armington model - Rice in the husk 
Without tariff (equation 5)  With tariff (equation 7) 
Import Sources 





Rest of the world 
0.92
*  (8.63)  1.24
*  (7.03) 
* denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Note: Results after correction of autocorrelation. 
 
Table 6 - Armington model with a non-homothetic CES utility function - Rice in the 
husk 
Without tariff (equation 10)  With tariff (equation 11) 
Import Sources 
s  t value  mi  t value  s  t value  mi  t value 
USA   468000000
*   3.31   637000000
*   3.74 
India  440083  0.11   1214620   0.48 
Suriname   22238814   0.94   33591858   1.22 
Thailand   40018186   1.94  16705515  1.88 
Rest of the world 
0.87
*  13.01 
 268000000
*   3.96 
0.99
*  39.07 
 489000000
*   4.48 
* denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Note: Results after correction of autocorrelation. 
 
At this stage in our study, three remarks can be made. First, including tariffs (even a fixed 
rate tariff) can well change the results of the Armington model. In other words, ignoring the 
tariff may lead to underestimation of the elasticity of substitution, and the results may be 
biased. Secondly, the estimations with a non homothetic CES function show that estimates of 
s depend on the subsistence level requirements (mi). It is particularly worthwhile to consider 
non homothetic preferences. If we estimate the model ignoring mi, the results may turn out to 
be biased. Thirdly, we can observe that mi, when significant, is negative. We have already 
mentioned that if mi  is negative, then the Engel curves are shifted above the origin, implying 




under  that  level  of  expenditure,  there  is  no  import  of  rice,  i.e.  the  consumers  prefer  the 
domestic market (see figure 1). 
 
5.2.   Simulation: discriminating tariff and change in market shares 
Before 2004 (prior to the last CAP reform), the EU imposed a common tariff on the entire 
group of rice exporters and it was approximately between 25% and 50% of the import price 
(table 1).
7 According to the EBA Agreement, the EU intends to reduce or remove the tariff for 
some rice exporting countries from 2009 onwards (particularly for LDCs in the EBA schedule 
such as Suriname and Guyana). ACP countries also benefit a tariff reduction. It is clear that 
with  tariff  discrimination  (or  trade  barriers),  the  relative  prices  change  and  consequently 
market access of rice exporters will change. The degree of change in the import and market 
accesses depends on the substitution elasticity and the tariff variations. 
Thus, in order to forecast the changes in the market access of large rice exporters to the EU, 
we use the estimated Armington models over the period 1962 2004 developed in the previous 
section to simulate five cases of discriminating tariffs with different rates. In this prospective, 
we use the price level in 2004 and build five scenarios: 
i.  Without any tariff on imports. We use the price level of the last year, 2004.  
ii.  We assume that the EU puts a 25% tariff on the exports of developed countries 
(which here are the USA and Australia).
8  
iii.  Similar to the second scenario, but we increase the tariff to 50%. 
9 
iv.  The EU imposes a 25% tariff on all exporters, except the LDCs (here Suriname).  
v.  Similar to the fourth scenario, but we increase the tariff to 50%. 
                                                 
7 Nevertheless, since the price of rice is not the same for each trading partner, this tariff represented from 25% to 
50% of the import price (depending on the type of rice, the source and the period under consideration). 
8 The tariff rates equal 262 $/1000 kg and 448 $/1000 kg, respectively for rice in the husk and rice glazed or 
polished which represent 25% of the imported prices. We choose this scenario because this percentage is the 
minimum weight of the tariff on rice imports. It can be compared to the tariff analysis in the following scenario 
(iii), corresponding to the double and the maximum tariff weight.  
9 The tariff rates equal 524 $/1000 kg and 869 $/1000 kg, respectively for rice in the husk and rice glazed or 




The results of these scenarios are reported in tables 7 and 8 for rice glazed or polished and in 
tables 9 and 10 for the rice in the husk. We mention both the imported quantity (tons) and the 
market accesses (or import shares) (%) for exporters in each table.  
 
Table 7: Forecast of the quantity of imports (tons) and the import shares (%) based on 
original Armington model (equation 5) - Rice glazed or polished 
Scenario I  Scenario II  Scenario III  Scenario IV  Scenario V 
The import source 
Imports (tons) 
USA  88305.7  71083.9  60203.4  84399.5  81848.3 
Thailand  88517.0  93626.1  99115.1  84601.5  82044.3 
India  5137.5  5434.0  5752.6  4910.2  4761.8 
Suriname  10754.1  11374.8  12041.7  13505.6  16371.0 
Australia  6446.1  5189.0  4394.7  6161.0  5974.8 
Rest of the world  89253.7  94405.3  99940.0  112089.5  135871.4 
  Import shares (%) 
USA  30.62  25.29  21.39  27.61  25.04 
Thailand  30.69  33.31  35.22  27.68  25.10 
India  1.78  1.93  2.04  1.61  1.46 
Suriname  3.73  4.05  4.28  4.42  5.01 
Australia  2.24  1.85  1.56  2.02  1.83 









Table 8: Forecast of the quantity of imports (tons) and the import shares (%) based on 
non-homothetic CES utility function (equation 10) - Rice glazed or polished 
Scenario I  Scenario II  Scenario III  Scenario IV  Scenario V 
The import source 
Imports (tons) 
USA  79340.3  63940.2  53671.5  75818.0  73469.4 
Thailand  118283.0  121533.6  124783.2  105536.7  97038.8 
India  5358.2  6169.1  6979.7  4274.7  3552.3 
Suriname  11086.9  11490.9  11894.8  13051.8  15016.5 
Australia  8671.1  8931.2  9104.6  8925.2  9094.6 
Rest of the world  151416.8  161525.3  171630.9  200580.3  249738.3 
  Import shares (%) 
USA  21.21  17.12  14.20  18.57  16.40 
Thailand  31.61  32.53  33.01  25.86  21.66 
India  1.43  1.65  1.85  1.05  0.79 
Suriname  2.96  3.08  3.15  3.20  3.35 
Australia  2.32  2.39  2.41  2.19  2.03 
Rest of the world  40.47  43.24  45.40  49.14  55.76 
 
As shown in these tables, Australia and the USA reach their maximum market shares under 
scenario I (i.e. without changes in relative import prices). With the other scenarios, market 
access  of  the  USA  decreases.  The  USA  obtain  the  minimum  market  access  in  the  third 
scenario with 21.39% and 14.20% for rice glazed or polish and 17.8% and 14.29% for rice in 
the husk respectively with original and non homothetic Armington model. The changes of 
market access of other developed countries (Australia) are similar. Conversely, the Suriname 
in the case of fifth scenario (i.e. free access to the EU market only for the LDCs) displays the 
maximum increase in its share of the EU market.  




Table 9- Forecast of the quantity of imports (tons) and the import shares (%) based on 
original Armington model (equation 5) - Rice in the husk 
Scenario I  Scenario II  Scenario III  Scenario IV  Scenario V 
The import source 
Imports (tons) 
USA  182581.6  155809.0  137646.2  175167.8  170334.6 
Thailand  253709.2  266039.5  278114.5  243407.2  236691.2 
India  11265.8  11813.4  12349.6  10808.4  10510.2 
Suriname  78385.7  82195.2  85925.9  92407.7  106331.7 
Rest of the world  238488.9  250079.5  261430.0  281151.0  323514.8 
  Import shares (%) 
USA  23.9  20.3  17.8  21.8  20.1 
Thailand  33.2  34.7  35.9  30.3  27.9 
India  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.3  1.2 
Suriname  10.3  10.7  11.1  11.5  12.5 
Rest of the world  31.2  32.7  33.7  35.0  38.2 
 
 
Table 10: Forecast of the quantity of imports (kg) and the import shares (%) based on 
non-homothetic CES utility function (equation 10) - Rice in the husk 
Scenario I  Scenario II  Scenario III  Scenario IV  Scenario V 
The import source 
Imports (Tons) 
USA  244528.4  185449.8  146081.0  244942.4  245227.0 
Thailand  228483.8  232474.8  236466.8  184653.6  155434.0 
India  88621.9  90208.1  91794.7  73936.4  64146.3 
Suriname  166568.3  168749.5  170931.2  171311.5  176055.7 
Rest of the world  257971.5  297085.1  336207.6  343027.9  428101.9 
  Import shares (%) 
USA  24.8  19.0  14.9  24.1  22.9 
Thailand  23.2  23.9  24.1  18.1  14.5 
India  9.0  9.3  9.4  7.3  6.0 
Suriname  16.9  17.3  17.4  16.8  16.5 
Rest of the world  26.2  30.5  34.3  33.7  40.0 




Comparing tables 7 and 8, and then 9 and 10, the original Armington model shows a larger 
market access than the non homothetic model for Suriname for both types of rice. Although 
the estimated market accesses according to the two models (original and non homothetic) are 
different, the direction of changes in the two models is the same. Consequently, in the trade 
policy reforms, paying attention to the relative import prices is very important. Moreover, this 
simulation shows that although a preferential tariff could increase market access of the LDCs, 
this increase is not great. Particularly, this is observed with the two last scenarios (IV and V) 
which  better  represent  the  situation  in  2009.  The  supply  side  problems  (i.e.  domestic 
dilemmas  in  LDCs  such  as  poor  infrastructures,  weak  technology  and  small  capacity 
production) could not allow the LDCs to reap the benefits of preferential tariffs. 
 
6.   Conclusion 
The Armington model is very well known for trade analysis of agricultural products. The 
Armington elasticities are particularly important for CGE models since they influence the 
outcomes of policy shocks introduced to these models. Therefore, it is important to measure 
right estimations of Armington elasticities. The size of the Armington elasticities could have a 
large effect on the terms of trade or the implied tariff equivalent of regional trade agreements.  
This paper seeks to analyze the substitution elasticities between the large exporters of rice to 
the  EU  and  to  consider  the  changes  in  their  market  accesses.  In  addition,  we  attempt  to 
respond  to  the  following  questions:  First:  Does  the  inclusion  of  import  tariffs  in  the 
specification  lead  to  different  estimated  Armington  elasticities?  Second:  When  a 
discriminating tariff is introduced, what happens to the market access of large rice exporters 
to the EU, especially the LDCs)? 
Thus, we present the Armington model derived from a CES utility function, and then a non 
homothetic  CES  utility  functional  form,  which  is  more  flexible.  We  also  calculate  the 
Armington elasticities and the market accesses of large rice exporters to the EU. 
Our  empirical  findings,  as  applied  to  the  import  demand  for  rice  of  the  EU,  lead  to  the 
following conclusions. 1. The assumption of homotheticity is valid only for specific cases. 2. 
Ignoring  the  import  tariff  when  estimating  Armington  elasticities  may  cause  them  to  be 
underestimated. 3. It is worthwhile considering non homothetic preferences. Ignoring tariffs 
and subsistence level requirements (mi) when estimating the model may also lead to biased 




Adding  to  these  conclusions,  the  simulation  findings  demonstrate  that  in  spite  of  a  large 
difference between import tariff rate of Suriname and other countries (scenario V), its market 
access  would  not  change  greatly.  This  problem  may  be  caused  by  the  small  production 
capacity and weak technology in LDCs (supply side problems). It shows the weak capacity of 
such a country to compete with developed countries such as the USA. It could demonstrate 
how difficult it is for a LDC to increase its market access, and in so doing, to increase its 
development level. This could also reflect the situation in 2009: even if the LDCs will have 
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